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MISBEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
Jacob Hale Russell*
Many legal rules—ranging from common-law contract doctrines to modern con-
sumer protection regulations—are designed to protect individuals from their own
mistakes. But scholars have neglected a core difficulty facing such policies: we
humans are a motley bunch, and we are defined in part by our idiosyncrasies. As a
result, one person’s mistake is another’s ideal choice. Making matters worse, it is
hard to observe when a policy response misfires. If cognitive errors and psychologi-
cal biases are as prevalent as current research suggests, then we have no reliable
way of knowing consumers’ true preferences. So are we always faced with a di-
lemma, where any approach that helps one group of consumers must hurt another?
This Article suggests an approach to this impasse. The key is to distinguish two
potential sources of individual preferences: subjective tastes and objective circum-
stances. For example, two day-traders betting in the stock market may differ along
either dimension. Each may place a different subjective value on the thrill of gam-
bling (taste), and a stock market loss may have different impacts on each trader’s
objective financial health (circumstance). This distinction can guide policy. Con-
sumers likely have better information on their subjective tastes, while third-party
interventions can often make better use of objective circumstances in improving
choices.
This approach underscores some of the limitations of the rising reliance on be-
havioral economics and psychology in legal scholarship and policy. This Article
discusses how discerning tastes from circumstances could guide regulation of press-
ing issues including payday lending and investor protection.
INTRODUCTION
Consider two individuals, each of whom takes out a payday loan
with a 400% annual percentage rate (APR),1 the cheapest form of
* Assistant Professor, Rutgers Law School. I am grateful to participants at the following
conferences where the Article was presented: the American Law & Economics Association
Annual Meeting, the Boulder Summer Conference on Consumer Financial Decision Making,
the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the Canadian Law and Economics
Association annual meeting, the Stanford Law School Fellows workshop, a faculty colloquium
at Rutgers Law School, and an informal workshop of Bay Area transactional legal scholars
organized by UC Hastings. For comments and discussions, I especially thank Vanessa Casado
Pe´rez, Richard Craswell, Jared Ellias, Diego Gil McCawley, Ron Gilson, Joe Grundfest, Jim
Hawkins, Mark Kelman, Mike Klausner, Rob MacCoun, and George Triantis.
1. A 400% APR is fairly typical of payday loan products. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BU-
REAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS 9 (2013), http://files.consumerfin
ance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf (“A fee of $15 per $100 is quite com-
mon for a storefront payday loan, and would yield an APR of 391% on a typical 14-day
loan.”).
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credit the market offers them. The first consumer uses the loan for
short-term consumption, at an interest rate that is likely to trap the
borrower into a long-term debt spiral with high fees and refinanc-
ing charges. This borrower may not fully understand the choice
they have made because of their cognitive limits, such as the wide-
spread inability to understand the effects of compound interest.2
The second consumer uses that payday loan to finance a car repair
or bus ticket necessary to obtain transportation to work—a rational
investment that they should be able to repay quickly because its ex-
pected value exceeds the cost of the loan. Policy designed to
protect the first individual may harm the second.
This Article supplies a missing piece to the puzzle of regulating
systematic mistake.3 “Mistake” in this context means any choice
whose expected result would diverge from a consumer’s true under-
lying preferences—what she “really wants.”4 Mistakes arise due to
behavioral and cognitive biases, information problems, or instabil-
ity of preferences.5 Most law-and-economics oriented approaches to
policymaking begin with the idea that choices made in the market-
place reveal preferences. But growing evidence suggests that this
presumption is often dangerous. In markets with persistent mis-
takes, such revealed “preferences” do not necessarily equate to the
participants’ actual preferences. For instance, half of all payday
loans wind up rolled over ten or more times as fees and interest
skyrocket, providing the primary source of revenue for payday lend-
ers.6 For at least some payday borrowers, their initial choices thus
corresponded poorly to their actual preferences.
In general, policy should be set to whatever rule is most likely to
result in consumer choices that match consumer preferences. In a
well-functioning market, that is easy: the free market facilitates such
choice. By contrast, regulating markets with mistakes is challenging
because mistakes can be hard to distinguish from rational choice,
and consumers’ preferences vary. Scholars have often implicitly as-
sumed that there is one policy strategy best suited for this
challenge. But they do not agree on what strategy that is; some ar-
gue for leaving the market unregulated, while others focus on
2. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance, 64
J. FIN. 2807 (showing that cognitive biases that make it difficult to understand compound
interest rates may explain a variety of widespread financial mistakes).
3. Legal scholarship on cognitive and behavioral mistakes is vast and growing, see infra
notes 9–13, but its origins are often traced to Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.B (discussing why mistakes arise and persist in some markets).
6. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,864,
47,874 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
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improving choice architecture. A one-size-fits-all approach is mis-
guided when consumers are heterogeneous. There is no reason to
believe a single regulatory policy should dominate across fields.
Sometimes unregulated markets might match well, sometimes not.
Likewise, some governmental regulation enhances matching; other
times, matching may not be the goal, and regulation may override
matching by prohibiting an activity that some people desire.
This Article argues that we must stop dancing around a central
problem facing all scholars and policymakers with views on con-
sumer protection, autonomy, and choice. The problem is this: no
policy—or decision not to adopt a policy—can be entirely value
neutral as to consumers’ underlying preferences. Any rule or regu-
lation—or decision to have no rule or regulation—that makes a
claim about consumer choices requires a normative judgment
about what preferences are relevant in a market. Preferences are a
construct and cannot be measured directly, and advances in behav-
ioral economics have helped underscore why all estimates run into
problems.
Since such a judgment is inevitable, this Article presents a simple
tool to help guide regulation: distinguishing between two factors
that influence preferences: subjective tastes and objective prefer-
ences.7 Individuals may vary along both dimensions. For instance,
day-traders share one trait in common: they are likely to lose
money.8 But their underlying preferences may differ. Some con-
sumers may have a taste for sensation-seeking and day-trade for its
consumption rather than investment value, like many gamblers.
Others may day-trade for investment value, in which case they are
making a costly mistake. Their circumstances may differ too, such
as their relative vulnerability to financial losses from day-trading.
Identifying the sources of preferences may help us decide how dif-
ferent areas should be regulated. Both payday borrowing and day-
trading lead to costly losses and likely implicate some miscalcula-
tion by participants. But they may have different claims on
regulation: we can arguably distinguish “good” from “bad” day-trad-
ers by their relative tastes for sensation; “good” and “bad” payday
borrowers may be distinguished more by circumstances.
This Article tries to suggest a way through the increasingly dead-
locked arguments over what policy tools best serves consumer
autonomy. The best known of these debates revolves around
7. This distinction is echoed in various parts of the psychology-and-law literature, but
the clearest exposition is found in MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011).
8. See infra Part I.C (reviewing the overwhelming evidence, both theoretical and
empirical).
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whether “nudging”—setting default rules with the hope of improv-
ing consumer choices—improves or violates freedom of choice.
Widespread agreement that mistakes sometimes happen has not
led to consensus about the appropriate response to this debate. For
some, improving choice architecture makes good sense, since
choice architecture and cognitive limits will influence decision-mak-
ing whether or not policymakers intervene.9 For others, such efforts
are likely to misfire because the government may not know which
bias affects a particular consumer in a particular choice, as one rep-
resentative account by Alan Schwartz warns.10 Schwartz and other
like-minded scholars are surely right on that point, but their pre-
ferred policy recommendation, a laissez-faire default, does not
follow and does not necessarily serve their core goal of preserving
autonomy. “Autonomy” is a slippery term. A thin meaning of auton-
omy may simply be the freedom to blindly make choices without
governmental restriction—but real autonomy hardly seems served
if consumers routinely make harmful mistakes or are forced to
spend excessive time researching choices.11 A better conception of
autonomy requires some correspondence between choices and
preferences. Although the advent of behavioral economics has
brought increased focus on the issue of consumer mistake,12 it has
not been a panacea.13
9. The earliest and best-known proponents of nudging are RICHARD THALER & CASS
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WELFARE, AND HAPPINESS (2008) and
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmet-
ric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (“[P]eople often make serious mistakes in deciding important mat-
ters. . . . My task here is not to deny these obvious truths, but to ask about their significance in
certain transactional settings.”); Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV.
1373 (2015); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006) (advocating that lawmakers take into account individual mis-
takes among groups when crafting regulation).
11. For instance, consumers may be more satisfied with choices when the initial choice
set is limited. Mark Lepper & Sheena Iyengar, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too
Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000). A nuanced account of
autonomy by a legal scholar—one that avoids both perils while recognizing the difficulty of
defining the term—is CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1998), about the
complicated role of patient choice in the practice of medicine.
12. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 749 (2008).
13. Behavioral economics’ predictive power is heavily limited because multiple explana-
tions can be proposed for any given choice. For an early piece on this issue, see Mark
Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998). A more recent critique is Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How
Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014). For explanations
that tie the difficulties back to the underlying psychological literature, see KELMAN, THE
HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra note 7; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
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Rather than asking what general regulatory technique preserves
autonomy, this Article shows that scholars would do better to disag-
gregate one question into two more tractable ones. First, in a given
area of regulation, what preferences are we trying to match, and do they
implicate taste or circumstances? Once we have identified those, we can
ask, what policy would be best for matching those preferences? Although
even well-informed judgments on preferences are necessarily
guesses, identifying the relevant types of underlying preferences in-
forms both the extent and nature of a response. For instance, in
some extreme cases, we may realize we do not care about underly-
ing preferences; criminal law, for obvious reasons, is insensitive to a
would-be perpetrator’s preferences, and the primary goal is reduc-
ing other social costs.
If policymakers decide that a domain revolves around tastes, it
suggests a core strategy for a policy: policy should elicit consumers
to provide more information about their tastes.14 For example, the
ideal nudge—but by no means all real-world nudges—does this. By
contrast, if a rule is focused on circumstances, the core strategy is to
tailor rules according to proxies.15 Proxies are observable traits that
correlate to relevant underlying circumstances. These two strategies
draw on basic intuitions from game theory. Judgments about pref-
erences can be informed by many sources, but eliciting more
information is a useful policy goal. When a contracting party faces
observational equivalence,16 it often tries to force the provision of
further information and turn a pooling equilibrium into a separat-
ing one—essentially, to make an inaccurate signal too costly. Policy
can take a similar tack.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I discusses the problem of
mistakes and the identification of preferences. In Part I.A, I provide
a brief description of preferences and cognitive errors and, drawing
on recent economics modeling, explain why mistakes are likely to
arise and persist in some markets. The remainder of Part I discusses
(2000); Robert J. MacCoun, The Relativity of Judgment as a Challenge for Behavioral Law and
Economics, 2 DAITO BUNKA U. L. REV. 29 (2006); Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Psychological Founda-
tions of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675;.
14. See infra Part II.A. Of course, there are many reasons to suspect in most domains,
getting at tastes may ultimately be impossible. For a thorough discussion of this problem in
the context of a medical choice that poses intertemporal tradeoffs, see Mark Kelman, Hard
Choices and Deficient Choosers (May 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. Schwartz has used the term “observationally equivalent” to describe the problem
facing consumer regulators. Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, supra note 10, at 1377. I ex-
tend the use of this term, which is drawn from game theory, by noting that game theory has
in fact suggested a variety of solutions to this problem, which regulatory strategies could
employ.
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two illustrative case studies where consumers are heterogeneous,
but for different reasons. Part I.B describes mistakes made by pay-
day borrowers, who I argue can be categorized by differences in
circumstances. Part I.C describes mistakes made by stock-market
day traders, who can be categorized by diverging tastes. In Part II, I
discuss what ideal policies result from this analysis. After discussing
general rules guiding a policy choice, I focus on examples of each
of my two policy strategies: proxies to regulate domains with hetero-
geneous circumstances, like payday borrowing, and elicitation to
regulate domains with heterogeneous tastes, like day-trading.
I. IDENTIFYING PREFERENCES, TASTES, AND CIRCUMSTANCES
This section proceeds in three parts. First, I define the basic
terms and problems that confront consumer protection policy, in-
cluding preferences, tastes, and circumstances. Drawing on cutting-
edge research in economics, I explain why mistakes might survive in
markets, despite strong mechanisms that neoclassical economics
typically takes for granted, like marginal consumers and the ability
of consumers to learn. In the second sub-part, I discuss pay-day bor-
rowers as an example of a domain where consumers are affected
differently depending on their objective circumstances. Finally, the
third sub-part discusses stock-market day-trading, an activity that
produces nearly certain expected losses, as an example of an area
where consumers may differ mainly in tastes.
A. What are Preferences and Mistakes, and Why Do Mistakes Sometimes
Persist in Markets?
A consumer’s preference is what we might colloquially call their
“real,” “considered,” “normative,”17 or “underlying” preference.18
17. The term “normative preference” is used in John Beshears et al., How Are Preferences
Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787 (2008) (identifying five factors that may cause divergence
between revealed and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal
experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal choice).
18. Throughout, I will use the term preferences to refer to “true” preferences, as com-
pared to revealed preferences for those revealed through observed choice. This avoids confusion
inherent in other terms that scholars have sometimes used to refer to true preferences, like
“normative preferences.”
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Tomes could be (and have been) written on how tractable or mean-
ingful this concept is.19 The complexity of preference formation,
and change in preferences over time, is surely part of what makes
life interesting. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt, for instance, sug-
gested that it might be our second-order volitions—volitions about
the kinds of volitions we form, such as an unwilling drug addict who
would prefer not to prefer drugs—that make us human.20 For the
purpose of this Article, I make an assumption that seems minimally
controversial for utilitarian-minded approaches to policy: that con-
sumers have or could form some preference about a given subject.21
Preferences are important because most of us would, all other
things held equal, prefer to match people’s real-world choices to
their actual preferences.22 Preferences in the real world often
loosely and colloquially have two components: taste and circum-
stance.23 Tastes and circumstances interact to determine the
expected result of a choice. I may have a taste for vanilla ice cream
but a circumstance of being diabetic. There are of course line-draw-
ing and endogeneity problems: my taste may change once I
discover that I am diabetic, either immediately or gradually, as I
spend more time enjoying other foods in my diet.
Preferences cannot, by hypothesis, be measured directly. Many
debates have ensued over how to estimate preferences.24 Revealed
19. The most important writer on this subject in the economics tradition is probably
Amartya Sen. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
20. Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL 5, 5 n.1, 11
n.5 (1971); see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRA-
TIONALITY 36–103 (1979).
21. This assumption may be misleading in certain areas of consumer finance, where
consumers may be rationally apathetic or irredeemably uninformed—although those may
themselves simply be preferences (preference for having time to do other things over opti-
mizing the right financial answer).
22. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
976–1038 (2001); see also Daniel M. Hausman, Why Satisfy Preferences? (Max Planck Inst. of
Econ., Working Paper No. 1124, 2012), ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/evo/discussionpapers/
2011-24.pdf (critiquing how scholars have conflated preferences and utility).
23. Mark Kelman illustrates the taste-circumstances distinction in the following
example:
Tastes are homogenous if all aspirin buyers with children under 5, aware of the actual
risk of poisoning if they purchased bottles without child-proofing, would purchase
child-proof bottles, even given the disutility that results from the fact that such bottles
are more inconvenient to use or more costly. Circumstances would differ, though, if
some, but not all, consumers rarely or never had young children in their households.
KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra note 7, at 155.
24. See Botond Ko¨szegi & Matthew Rabin, Revealed Mistakes and Revealed Preferences, in
THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK 193 (Andrew Cap-
lin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008) (serving as an example of scholars who have grappled with
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“preferences” are the most common means of measuring actual
preferences. But they are a potentially dangerously unreliable indi-
cator, at least in part because they may be warped by systematic
behavioral and cognitive biases and in part because they may not
meaningfully reflect certain aspects of preferences.25 Revealed pref-
erences are, by definition, a contingent response to a particular
situation. Consumers may be observationally equivalent based on
revealed preference but not equivalent with respect to preference.26
A mistake, in this Article’s usage, refers to a divergence between
the expected result of a revealed “preference” (revealed by virtue of
a choice) and actual preference.27 Identifying mistakes in the real
world requires a theory of preferences. Many behavioral-law-and-ec-
onomics scholars have conflated laboratory errors and real-world
mistakes, the latter of which require a normative, contingent theory
to identify.28 Clearly not all such mistakes warrant equal regulatory
how to estimate revealed preferences when mistakes are prevalent). The method requires the
researcher to make assumptions about reasonable explanations for particular behavior. Id. at
194; see also Boton Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, Mistakes in Choice-Based Welfare Analysis, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 477, 477 (2007). Other ways this might be done—each of which has problems
and cannot be said to be a direct measure of true preferences—include survey evidence, field
studies, studies of sellers’ behavior to identify, and examination of choice reversals. See, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93
(2010) (studying seller behavior); Jim Hawkins, Exploiting Advertising, 80 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43 (2017) (studying seller behavior); Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, supra note 10,
at 1380–81, 1402–03 (advocating fields studies); Jacob Goldin & Daniel H. Reck, Revealed
Preference Analysis with Framing Effects 1 n.1 (unpublished manuscript) (May 31, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417709 (“By preferences, we mean
the relative consistency of the available options with a decision-maker’s objectives, whatever
those may be. Preferences are not defined according to a decision-maker’s observed choices;
doing so would assume away the question we address by ruling out choice reversals.”).
25. A separate problem is that the data of revealed preferences may be incomplete com-
pared to the domain in which we are trying to predict preferences, leaving us to extrapolate
in ways that go beyond the data we have—and in doing so, to use “other sources of knowl-
edge about the kinds of things that our fellow citizens prefer.” Richard Craswell,
Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1428–29 (1998)
(noting that “any attempt to estimate a utility function will have to be based on extrapola-
tions from a comparatively small set of data”). Revealed preferences may also be dangerously
unreliable for more philosophical reasons—that choice may not really be a measure of de-
sire. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 769; Amartya K. Sen, Choice
Functions and Revealed Preference, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 307 (1971); Sen, Rational Fools, supra
note 19.
26. Schwartz, Regulating Rationality, supra note 10 (regarding observational equivalence).
I discuss the problem in the context of those who opt out of nudges in retirement savings
plans, in Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L.J.
35, 65–67, 73 (2015).
27. KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra note 7, at 155.
28. See David C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy of Social Judgment, 101
PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 75, 76 (1987) (“An ‘error’ is a judgment of a laboratory stimulus that
deviates from a model of how the judgment should be made. . . . A ‘mistake,’ by contrast, is
an incorrect judgment in the real world, such as a misjudgment of a real person, and so must
be determined by different criteria. Detection of an error implies the existence of a mistake
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attention. Imagine a consumer with preference p, who makes
choice (revealed preference) p’. To make the example more con-
crete, assume that Adrienne takes out a pay-day loan (revealed
preference p’). We cannot measure Adrienne’s preference (p) di-
rectly, but we can imagine several reasons why p’ and p might
converge or diverge. For instance, if she uses the loan to repair a
car to get to work, without which she would be fired, they may con-
verge: she is able to repay the loan, and it was the best credit she
could access at the time. But p’ may also diverge from p, because of
at least one of the following: error and bias, information costs, or ex
post circumstances.
(1) Cognitive error and psychological biases—non-rational or
bounded rational explanations—that arise ex ante. Cataloging such
effects has been the major project of behavioral economists and
their behavioral-law-and-economics progeny, and various effects
have been amply cataloged elsewhere in legal scholarship.29 To give
just a few examples, Adrienne may be overly optimistic about her
ability to repay the loan, perhaps because of overconfidence in her
ability to invest the funds in a project whose expected return ex-
ceeds the rate of return. Or she may be overly optimistic because
she focuses too much on a salient example of another consumer
who was able to repay a similar loan despite the many who have not.
Finally, she may have an inherent bias in how she processes and
compares interest rates.
(2) Search costs and information costs that arise ex ante. These
are rational explanations. They certainly encompass misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, under-disclosure, or other problems in the inducement
of the contract that we normally seek to regulate. But even in mar-
kets where we have addressed some of these issues, there may be
search costs that prevent choices from reliably revealing actual pref-
erences.30 For instance, Adrienne may have missed out on a better
loan option.31
only when the process that produces the error also produces incorrect judgments in real
life.”); see also Kelman, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra note 7.
29. See supra nn.8, 10 & 13; see also PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM
SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY-
MAKERS (2010).
30. See John W. Pratt et al., Price Differences in Almost Competitive Markets, 93 Q.J. ECON.
189 (1979) (discussing price dispersion). For a recent discussion, see Michael D. Grubb,
Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 47 REV. INDUS. ORG. 303 (2015).
31. A defender of revealed preferences might say that Adrienne’s preferences have been
matched: she paid money to avoid other costs from searching further. There are several
problems with this argument. For one, it rests on a tautology: we believe this because we
believe that revealed “preferences” indicate preferences. Second, cognitive errors may come
in: the consumer may be subject to systematic errors that mean she did not systematically
calculate the tradeoff. Finally, the presence of search costs means that markets may misprice
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(3) Ex post circumstances, including external factors or the prob-
lem of multiple selves and regret, may cause divergence. Imagine
that Adrienne uses the loan for a project that fails (or for pure con-
sumption), and she is unable to repay it. She now regrets the
decision and thinks that if she could make the decision with the
benefit of hindsight, she would not have taken out the loan. This
may produce the least sympathetic case to regulatory relief, espe-
cially to the extent that we believe the regret in the fourth case is
caused by extrinsic misfortune—in other words, the possibility of
bad luck really was part of the risk-return package that Adrienne
was buying.32 But it is a much harder case if she is the victim of
multiple selves: an in-the-moment desire to consume that is later
regretted. To decide that one version of herself is more deserving
of regulatory help than another is a normative, not empirical, ques-
tion.33 Scholars have sidestepped that problem when, like Schwartz,
they argue that autonomy is served by simply defaulting to an as-
sumption that consumer choices are rational.34
goods. Therefore, to the extent a consumer makes the choice to avoid search costs because
she trusts market pricing, her choice is not a good proxy for her preferences. A rational
decision must be a bet that the price saved is more than the cost of searching. This may not
be true. A great example is provided by index mutual funds, where consumers do not mini-
mize mutual fund fees even when the data is presented in a straightforward way such that is
the only possible variable of relevance. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One
Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405 (2010); see also Jill E.
Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on
Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605 (2014)
32. Our views will be influenced by the stories we deem relevant in explaining behavior.
Consider a simple question: Should we allow Ralph to purchase scratch lottery tickets, an
investment with a negative expected value? Our instincts about the appropriate regulatory
response will depend heavily on how we imagine Ralph’s mistake. Consider four explana-
tions: First, Ralph genuinely enjoys the act of consumption, even knowing he will not win.
Second, Ralph, like most of us, systematically misunderstands probability and thinks winning
is more likely than it actually is. Third, Ralph is misled by puffery in marketing, which por-
trays lottery winners in a way that makes her think winning is likely. Fourth, Jane is outright
lied to by the sales clerk, who deliberately misleads him into thinking he’ll likely win. Each
story may have a glimmer of truth, and even if they represented distinct accounts, a regulator
may still be faced with observational equivalence when presented with two specific lottery
ticket buyers. Most of us will want to do something about the simple outright fraud, but we
likely have different instincts as to whether deeply rooted cognitive errors look more like
fraud (i.e., lack of genuine freedom to choose) or more like choice. Instincts on both ques-
tions are likely to depend on political, ideological, and moral taste, including the degree to
which we want to respect idiosyncratic tastes, or worry that such tastes actually reflect some-
thing other than subjective preferences.
33. See generally Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of Welfare, 33 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 391 (2005).
34. Schwartz, supra note 10. Schwartz claims deferring to revealed preferences is auton-
omy preserving, coherent, and administrable. Id. at 1403–06. It is certainly administrable. But
it is only coherent by Schwartz’s account with an additional assumption. Schwartz says it is
coherent because it is consistent with the government carrying the burden of “the imposition
of restrictions on consensual transactions.” Id. at 1403. That would only be true if we believe,
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Not all markets should be expected to see the same prevalence
and, more importantly, persistence of mistakes. One critical factor
is whether naı¨ve consumers obtain the benefits of sophisticated
consumers (similar results), or whether their results diverge.35 Law
and economics scholars have long argued that mistakes are unlikely
to persist in competitive markets.36 Even if there are naı¨ve consum-
ers, so the argument goes, their outcomes will be helped by a small
number of sophisticated consumers who push merchants to offer
more consumer-friendly contracts.37
The rising-tide-lifts-all-boats story is familiar and comforting—es-
pecially to regulation-averse scholars—and for many markets, it is
true. Consumers who do not read boilerplate contracts may benefit
from those who do, when merchants are unable to distinguish the
former from the latter and thus have to offer the same contract to
both.38 But this is not the full story. Indeed, in some markets, the
sophisticated benefit from the naı¨ve, as some cost savings from na-
ı¨ve overspending are passed onto them through cross-
subsidization.39 In such markets, the sophisticated consumers’ ris-
ing tide might better be thought of as swamping the boats of the
for instance, that transactions in an unregulated marketplace where sellers are rational and
buyers are irrational are “consensual.” Whether one believes this would seem to beg the
question: do those transactions (revealed preferences) reflect preferences, or not?
35. See, e.g., RAN SPIEGLER, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2011);
Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Consumer Protection and Contingent Charges, 50 J. ECON. LIT.
477 (2012); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Informa-
tion Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006). For a useful literature
review, see Botond Ko¨szegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, 52 J. ECON. LIT. 1075 (2014).
36. E.g., Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
131 (2008). An assumption in Schwartz’s analysis draws into question whether his analysis
applies to the markets discussed here. Schwartz assumes that contracts are independent: a
consumer who chooses a sophisticated contract in his analysis cannot benefit from another
consumer’s choice of a naı¨ve contract. Id. at 139–40 n.14. Schwartz claims that “few con-
sumer contracts have been identified . . . that permit [this kind] of cross subsidization . . . .”
Id. To the extent that claim is wrong, his analysis is not applicable.
37. See generally Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance, When and Why Consumers Should
Agree to Form Contracts without Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 413 (2015); Alan
Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Perfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of War-
ranties and Securities Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
38. For a psychological and experimental account of the problem of boilerplate, see
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1745
(2014) (arguing that the “can’t hurt” response by legal scholars to disclosures “leads to
overuse of disclosures that do not affect consumer decision-making, but have implicit effects
on the moral calculus of transactional harms”). For an argument that boilerplate is problem-
atic on other theoretical grounds, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012).
39. See Armstrong & Vickers, supra note 35.
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naı¨ve, causing them to sink. Beneficial search externalities are
crowded out by welfare-reducing “rip-off externalities.”40
For instance, many involve tied contracts: upfront charges fol-
lowed by contingent fees. These are prevalent in banking services
like the free checking accounts that come with a variety of pay-as-
you-go fees for services such as additional checks, ATM charges, and
overdrafts. Those who believe that rising tides lift all boats com-
monly assume that if one firm is exploiting consumers’ naivete´,
other competing firms will educate those consumers—ultimately
making the strategy not profitable. But as Gabaix and Laibson
show, this is not always the case.41 They present the case of a hotel
that charges a low rate, followed by high add-on fees for parking,
Wi-Fi, and other services. A competitor without such a pricing struc-
ture will have no incentive to provide education, because educated
consumers who understand the fee structure will simply continue to
stay at the cheaper hotel and use fewer of the add-on services. In
other words, the benefit redounds to the consumer, not the com-
petitor. Gabaix and Laibson term this the “curse of debiasing,”
which suggests that product attributes (add-on prices) may remain
shrouded even in equilibrium.
Contingent charges in banking, such as charges for overdraft
protection,42 may be especially problematic because consumers are
often unaware of those charges. They may even be unaware of the
terms themselves if they did not read the fine print—but even if
they are aware, banks usually levy the charges without further con-
sent. (Just look at the Starbucks customer who paid $34 for a $4.14
coffee.43 Overdraft protection does not warn you at the point of
sale.) If outcomes to sophisticated and naı¨ve consumers are
linked,44 sophisticated consumers who are aware of such charges
will have no incentive to improve terms by switching—because they
benefit from the market terms. In other words, the mechanism of
40. The terms are used in an excellent article that draws in much of the burgeoning
literature on modeling divergent results to naı¨ve and sophisticated consumers and implica-
tions for consumer protection. Mark Armstrong, Search Externalities and Ripoff Externalities, 47
REV. INDUS. ORG. 273 (2015). Note that I do not exclude the possibility that there are other
reasons why sophisticated consumers may fail to provide the benefits some assume they will.
For a thoughtful analysis of one reason why, see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from
Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151 (2014).
41. Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 35.
42. On the problems with overdraft checking, attempts to improve those problems
through nudges, and slippage in the regulatory strategy, see Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges
Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (2013). See also infra Part III.B.
43. Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards is a Boon for Banks, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-money/credit-and-debit-
cards/09debit.html. The consumer racked up $238 in overdraft charges in one day. Id.
44. Armstrong and Vickers, supra note 35.
SPRING 2018] Misbehavioral Law and Economics 561
the marginal consumer that many scholars rely on simply will not
work: the marginal, sophisticated consumer prefers the contract
where they pay a lower upfront fee, made possible by the presence
of naı¨ve consumers who will pay add-on fees that the diligent, so-
phisticated consumers avoid.
Fixed rate mortgages provide another striking example. Many
consumers fail to refinance fixed rate mortgages, even when mort-
gages at a lower fixed rate, including the associated fees, are
available. The mistake is prevalent: one study found that a quarter
of mortgagors were paying more than 2% higher than the market
rate.45 As a result, sophisticated consumers are likely obtaining
lower rates than what they would pay in a market where fixed-rate
mortgages are automatically refinanced, or in a more sophisticated
market where a higher fraction of consumers refinanced their
mortgages. It is not clear to what extent the surplus from overpay-
ing naı¨ve consumers flows to sophisticated consumers or simply
becomes a gain to mortgage sellers.
Such cross-subsidization may have problematic distributional
consequences if sophisticated consumers are systematically less vul-
nerable (wealthier, better educated) than naı¨ve consumers. There
is evidence of this in the mortgage context, where the non-refinanc-
ing borrowers of fixed rate mortgages appear to be less educated,
poorer, and more likely to be minorities.46
Consider another reason why markets may not correct itself: the
problem of the “market for quacks”—a market where there are no
products worth buying, and so competition does not produce infor-
mation that is useful to consumers.47 An example of such a market
might include homeopathics, a growing $363 million market for
sugar pills that make bold health claims and are mostly unregulated
by the FDA.48 Normal paradigms based on imperfect information
do not make sense in such markets, where there are no high- and
low-quality products to distinguish between.49 If markets for quacks
worked correctly, there would be no price competition—rather,
45. For this statistic and a broader discussion of evidence of consumer financial mistake
in mortgages and other domains, given in the context of a presidential address to the Ameri-
can Finance Association, see John Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553 (2006).
46. Id.
47. Ran Spiegler, The Market for Quacks, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 1113 (2006).
48. Industry at a Glance: Homeopaths, IBISWORLD US, http://clients1.ibisworld.com/re-
ports/us/industry/ataglance.aspx?entid=4951 (last visited Jan. 2, 2018). The FDA recently
proposed stricter enforcement. FDA, DRUG PRODUCTS LABELED AS HOMEOPATHIC: GUIDANCE
FOR FDA STAFF AND INDUSTRY (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCom
plianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM589373.pdf.
49. SPIEGLER, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at
190.
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there would be no market at all. Typical market interventions like
disclosure that are designed to produce better information allow
the better products to thrive at the expense of the weaker ones. But
that idea relies on a potentially faulty assumption: that there are
good products to be had in the first place.50 This assumption may
be also problematic, for example, in mutual funds: to assume infor-
mation would improve mutual fund choice, we have to assume that
some managers can systematically beat the market and offer better
products.51
B. An Example of Heterogeneous Circumstances: Payday Borrowers
Payday loans provide an especially interesting case study for the
core problem facing consumer protection. Aside from their obvious
policy significance—not only do twelve million Americans use them
each year, but they have been implicated in debt spirals and bank-
ruptcy—payday loans are also the subject of a recent significant
rulemaking by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.52 Prob-
lematically, any policy intervention—or failure to intervene—seems
likely to hurt at least some set of consumers. Payday loans, which
are short, high-interest loans collateralized with a blank check to be
paid out of a borrower’s next salary payment, are often one of the
only sources of credit available to both the underbanked and un-
banked.53 In other words, depriving all borrowers of payday loans
would prevent some individuals who have no other access to credit
from obtaining emergency financing; potentially cause them to
turn to shadier sources of financing; or put financial strains on fam-
ily members or friends who are willing to loan emergency funds. At
the same time, for many, payday loans seem to be a costly mistake.
Studies are mixed as to the effect of payday loans, probably be-
cause effects differ amongst borrowers. Many borrowers appear to
be making a costly mistake. Four out of five borrowers don’t repay
50. See Spiegler, The Market for Quacks, supra note 47, at 1113.
51. See Spieglar, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 35, at 191.
52. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,864,
47,874 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041); see also David Silber-
man, We’ve Proposed Rules to Protect Consumers from Payday Debt Traps, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (June 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/
weve-proposed-rule-protect-consumers-payday-debt-traps/.
53. See generally JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS,
AND THE POOR 30–35, 56–59 (1994); Michael Barr, Banking the Poor 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121,
149–64 (2004); John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in CREDIT MAR-
KETS FOR THE POOR 17 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005).
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their initial loan and are rolled over to another loan within four-
teen days; three out of five pay more in fees than they borrow; four
out of five total borrows in the payday realm default at least once in
a given year.54 Some borrowers are quite clearly confused as to what
they are buying. One lender summarized its 1500% interest rate to
customers as “between $1.00 and $1.50 a day,” a claim that was
equal parts misleading (because breaking payments into daily
chunks makes the payments seem less onerous) and inaccurate (be-
cause the actual finance charge was closer to $1,000 a year).55
Because payday loans typically feature repeat refinancing and high
fees, lenders may not care whether the loan is ultimately repaid or
whether the consumer goes bankrupt—so long as sufficient fees are
paid along the way to bankruptcy or default. Indeed, studies have
found that payday loans induce, rather than relieve, financial hard-
ship.56 Payday loans compete with related loan forms, including
pawnshops (collateralized by an object that the borrower loses if
the loan is not repaid) and signature loans (higher-interest rate,
longer-term loans that are often designed to evade state regulation
of payday loans).
At the same time, payday loans may be an important—indeed,
the only—source of credit to certain consumers. Payday loans may
help some consumers weather financial shocks.57 When payday
loans are banned, studies have found consumers are more likely to
bounce checks or to file for Chapter 7.58 One study found that mul-
tiple welfare metrics—including foreclosures, births, and
admissions for alcohol and drug treatment—were improved by the
availability of payday loans.59 Payday loans may help borrowers
maintain employment.60 And pawnshops, a high-interest loan with a
54. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf; see 81
Fed. Reg. at 87,865–66 n.9 (citing the CFPB study).
55. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014).
56. Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market,
126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 519–20 (2011); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans
Cause Bankruptcy? (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417709.
57. Bart J. Wilson et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Demand for Payday Loans, B.E. J.
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2010).
58. DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT
NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS 3–4 (2008).
59. Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28, 28–29 (2011).
60. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply
Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 433, 436 (2009).
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very different collateral system, may function as a desirable commit-
ment device for consumers who rationally are aware of their own
self-control problems.61
Regardless of how one reads the overall empirical evidence, it is
certainly the case that payday loans have different impacts on differ-
ent borrowers. There are better borrowers and worse borrowers—
in other words, borrowers with different circumstances. Once
again, they may be observationally equivalent both to payday lend-
ers and regulators. We may decide that the costs of payday loans on
many consumers, and on the external environment,62 are so high
that a ban (or usury cap) makes sense.63 In other words, we would
accept pooling—but some consumers who rationally desire and ac-
curately assess the costs and benefits of a payday loan would be
excluded from the market. Such a decision could, of course, be
coupled with a decision to improve access to other forms of credit.
But most payday loan bans have not been coupled with improved
access to credit, and indeed such access may be politically infeasible
given the costs of originating a subprime loan. Bans on payday
loans could actually cause additional negative consequences, as
consumers may substitute other, potentially worse forms of payday-
like lending, including gray-market products.64
Why do payday lenders, who presumably do not want defaults fail
to discern better and worse borrowers on their own? In the conven-
tional story, this is simply because of typical information asymmetry
problems that plague lenders: among underbanked consumers who
have little credit history, they cannot distinguish those lenders who
are likely to repay from those who are not, so all are charged high
rates. If so, we may want to continue leaving payday loans in a dis-
persed world because lenders are more likely to have access to the
relevant information about ability to repay. Improving disclosure
61. Susan Payne Carter & Paige Marta Skiba, Pawnshops, Behavioral Economics, and Self-
Regulation, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 193, 195 (2012). Pawnshops may actually be a better
alternative source of credit to payday loans, but I do not explore this possibility in depth
here.
62. Again, externalities are an unreliable guide because the boundaries are so amor-
phous and hard to measure. Payday loans may decrease crime—by providing access to
money—or increase it—by creating debt traps that induce crime in order to make
repayments.
63. Many states ban or otherwise regulate loans; some have suggested a federal usury
cap is necessary. See Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Pay-
day Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 578–79, 619 (2010).
64. The signature loans in the N.M. case were lenders’ response to regulation making
payday loans difficult to offer. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 663
(N.M. 2014). Other studies have found borrowers switch to other high-interest credit, like
pawn shops, when payday loans are restricted. Neil Bhutta et al., Consumer Borrowing After
Payday Loan Bans, 59 J.L. & ECON. 225 (2016).
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could then be an adequate remedy. But this seems somewhat un-
likely because of the reverse information asymmetry: consumers
may have inadequate information in a way that that disclosure, due
to all its flaws, is unlikely to resolve. In other words, fees and refi-
nancing are designed to obscure the fact that lenders can withstand
high rates of eventual default in payday loans. Lenders can thus
exploit cognitive biases, such as consumers’ inability to understand
the effects of compound interest.
How would we separate payday borrowers along circumstances?
One possible way would be to look at broader macroeconomic con-
ditions in deciding whether to allow payday loans. For instance,
there is a good reason to believe the empirical evidence that payday
loans improve community welfare following a natural disaster.65 Fol-
lowing a disaster, almost any project invested in will have a high
expected return. A circumstance-tailored rule would take advantage
of this finding and allow payday loans following natural disasters,
while restricting them at other times. A second would be to look at
narrower conditions related to the particular borrower. What does
the borrower plan to use the money for? If there was a tractable way
to draw a consumption-investment line, or an indulgence-emer-
gency line, this could help distinguish borrowers—but might run
uncomfortably close to paternalistic taste-tailoring.
C. An Example of Heterogeneous Tastes: Stock Market Day Trading
Stock market day trading by individuals is largely unrestricted,
and on average, it causes participants who day-trade serious losses.
That day-trading must be a losing gamble makes sense in a world
where the stock market is at least somewhat efficient, meaning that
traders would not be expected to beat the market on average and
over time.66 Even if the market is somewhat inefficient,67 and we
65. Morse, supra note 59, at 41–42.
66. The best popular expositor of this view is BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DOWN WALL STREET (1973). For a straightforward finance explanation, see RICHARD BREALEY
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 312–40 (10th ed. 2011). For an explanation geared
towards legal scholars, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). For a good empirical summary of the financial costs of
active trading, see Kenneth R. French, Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN.
1537 (2008).
67. There is growing evidence, theoretical and empirical, of market inefficiency, but this
(fascinating) debate does not much affect this Article. For market inefficiency to make day
trading a winning strategy, we would have to believe that individuals have systematically better
ability to exploit such inefficiencies than professional Wall Street firms, given the higher fees
paid by individual investors for trading. Since the overwhelming evidence suggests that even
most professional firms cannot systematically beat the market, this seems dubious.
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assume the unlikely fact that individual investors have above-aver-
age abilities to exploit such inefficiencies through day-trading,68
such gains would be wiped out by high brokerage commissions and
spreads. We would expect losses, therefore, to be particularly con-
centrated in the most active investors, who may be particularly
prone to speculation (and therefore especially unlikely to be ex-
ploiting true inefficiencies) and who will pay the highest aggregate
fees.
Empirical evidence strongly supports this as a real-world prob-
lem: individual investors lose money, and day traders lose more
money.69 According to the best empirical estimates, average individ-
ual investors underperform the market by 1.5%, and the most
active ones (the top quintile by turnover) by 6.5%.70 Only 1% of day
traders in another study carry a profit, and the more active they are,
the worse they underperform.71 Barber and Odeon, the two finance
professors who have made the most contributions to the study of
day traders, put the results succinctly in one of their titles: “Trading
is hazardous to your wealth.”72
For a good overview of theoretical and empirical challenges to market efficiency, and
some of the difficulties faced by that work, see ANDRE SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS (2000).
The bar faced by opponents of EMH as a practical tool is higher than generally recognized.
For markets to be systematically inefficient, two conditions must be satisfied: biases must cause
systematic distortions that don’t cancel each other out, and arbitrage by traders who recog-
nize this must fail or be unavailable (because, for instance, there is not sufficient liquidity
available for arbitrage, or because arbitrage is not actually riskless because of the non-sub-
stitutability of alternative investments).
68. In fact, day-traders seem to lose money not just on fees, but by trading badly. In
principle, this means there is a profitable trading strategy available to them—make the oppo-
site bets. Some of this may have to do with cognitive differences in the way investors approach
buy versus sell decisions, but it may also suggest they have information and are systematically
misusing it. Terrance Odeon, Do Investors Trade Too Much?, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 1279 (1999)
69. For this Article, I am particularly concerned with individual, independent day-trad-
ers, not Wall Street firms or hedge funds that engage in day-trading. It may well be that
nobody makes money on average and over time by day trading, but it is certainly the case that
professional day-trading firms trade at a much lower cost, making the professional case po-
tentially less concerning. Of course, there are line drawing problems between professional
and individual investors.
70. Brad Barber & Terrance Odeon, The Behavior of Individual Investors, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1535, 1536 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013); see
Brad Barber & Terrance Odeon, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Invest-
ment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 792–94 (2000); Odeon, supra note 68, at
1281, 1284–85.
71. Brad M. Barber et al., The Cross-section of Speculator Skill: Evidence from Day Trading, 18
J. FIN. MKTS. 1, 3 (2014).
72. Barber & Odeon, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth, supra note 70.
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Losses from individual investing in general may be particularly
concentrated among lower-income, poorer, younger, and less edu-
cated investors who are less diversified.73 Indeed, contrary to the
image many may have of day-traders as ex-Wall Street mavens, the
day-trading population includes the less wealthy. Day-trading semi-
nars and books may disproportionately market to such
unsophisticated investors (think of the ubiquitous “earn $50-100K
working from home” ads).
Most finance academics would say that individuals should have
most, if not all, of their investments in diversified, passive vehicles
like index funds.74 But even those who disagree and would see
room for individual investors to hold individual stocks would be
hard-pressed to justify excessively active day-trading. Barber and
Odeon observed turnover rates too high to be consistent with any
possible alternative explanations, such as investors rebalancing
portfolios or selling stock to meet liquidity needs.75
Excessive trading behavior is particularly useful as the focus of
this Article because it cannot be rationally explained by risk appe-
tite. Unlike, say, having a portfolio composed of particularly risky
investments, churning has nothing to do with risk appetite or aver-
sion. An investor who is churning their portfolio may not be
changing the level of risk in their portfolio: instead, they are simply
accruing brokerage fees to trade in and out of stocks at a fixed level
of risk.76 To increase their exposure to risk, investors should choose
riskier investment allocations—not cycle between investments more
rapidly.
Why, if stock markets are just “costly casinos,”77 does churning
behavior persist? There are two broad categories of explanation:
first, inaccurate predictions of the expected returns to day-trading
caused by cognitive error and behavioral bias; second, sensation
seeking behavior.
In the first category, the day-trader is prone to a series of cogni-
tive errors. These could include overconfidence; the gambler’s
73. Anders Anderson, Trading and Under-Diversification, 17 REV. FIN. 1699, 1699–1704
(2013); Barber & Odeon, The Behavior of Individual Investors, supra note 70, at 1536, 1563.
74. See, e.g., French, supra note 66; see also MALKIEL, supra note 66, at 201–02 (advocating
a diversified portfolio).
75. Barber & Odean, supra note 70.
76. Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and Trading Activ-
ity 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12223, 2006), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w12223.
77. Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities
Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995). The phrase is Lynn Stout’s in her excellent piece on
the subject, but economists from John Keynes to James Tobin have analogized stock market
to a casino. Id. at 615–16 n. 10.
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fallacy, where gamblers attribute winning streaks to skill and losing
streaks to luck; or availability, where the most salient examples to
would-be day-traders are the few day-traders who have had the luck
to make (or pretended to make) money.
In the second category, individuals may day trade for the same
reason some gamblers enjoy casinos. They may enjoy the actual act
of trading—i.e., it has value as a consumption good rather than an
investment. Those who oppose intervention will be particularly in-
clined to this model. Indeed, this view has two advantages: first, it
fits the observable evidence, and second, it is potentially respectful
of the right of people to have idiosyncratic preferences in a hetero-
geneous society. But it has a major downside: it simply does not
seem to conform to what most day-traders say about themselves,
which is that they want to and will make money.78 Anti-intervention-
ists often suggest this is an autonomy-preserving assumption.79 But
the account seems to rest on a thin version of autonomy as per-
ceived choice.80 An equally plausible view of autonomy would have
us take the day-trader seriously when he tells us he intends to make
money.81
78. This can be reconciled by arguing another preference structure (1) to obtain sensa-
tion and thrill, and make money, (2) to obtain sensation and thrill even if he loses money,
(3) to make money without sensation and thrill, (4) to lose money without sensation and
thrill. That only makes the point that we can always hypothesize ends to fit a rational explana-
tion for even the most ludicrous behavior—even if reasonable people will disagree as to
whether this instance is one of ludicrous behavior.
79. See, e.g., Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, supra note 10.
80. A different article could analyze these issues primarily through the lens of a philo-
sophical commitment to autonomy, although I am not sure it would get us very far. For
thicker accounts of this difficulty, and critiques of commitments to thin versions of auton-
omy, see Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107 (Richard A. Wasserstrom
ed., 1971); see also SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM
(2013). Dworkin notes the line-drawing issues that come up in deciding whether an interven-
tion is the kind of paternalistic intervention a rational person would accept:
The difficult problem that must be faced is whether one can give sense to the notion
of a person irrationally attaching weights to competing values. Consider a person who
knows the statistical data on the probability of being injured when not wearing seat
belts in an automobile and knows the types of gravity of the various injuries. He also
insists that the inconvenience attached to fastening the belt every time he gets in and
out of the car outweighs for him the possible risks to himself. I am inclined in this case
to think that such a weighing is irrational.
DWORKIN, supra, at 121. While interesting and important, I doubt these line-drawing
problems can be usefully solved in most interesting public policy problems. As a result, the
generic goal of promoting autonomy is likely to remain an inherently incomplete guide to
policymaking. For a much better account of this, see SCHNEIDER, PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY,
supra note 11.
81. Of course, we could hypothesize a new preference structure to save the day-trader’s
apparent desire to make money while pursuing a losing strategy. Perhaps the day-trader pre-
fers (1) to have the right to choose an investing strategy even if in error, and to make money;
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Almost certainly, it is some combination of motives that differs
from person to person and that are difficult to systematically elicit.
(After all, our motives are sometimes mysterious even to ourselves.)
But those who would mainly attribute churning to enjoyment, the
consumptive value of trading, face two key problems. First, it is not
at all how day-traders seem to talk about themselves. Reading mes-
sage boards where day-traders discuss techniques suggests that day-
traders don’t see enjoyment as their primary motive. Many, maybe
most, sophisticated day-traders want to make money and believe
that they are making money82 or are on the verge of it. “Who ‘re-
ally’ believes this?”, one day-trader asks of the “random walk”
theory, about as basic of a finance concept as exists.83 “Quite a few
people actually,” another responds.84 “I’m not in that camp myself,
mind you, but they’re out there to be sure. It’s a heavily academi-
cally influenced theory, so you can guess where a lot of its
supporters come from.”85 Note the apparent denigration of “aca-
demically influenced” theories, as opposed to closely held views
grounded in real-world anecdotal observation. As one puts it: “I
don’t agree with this at all since I have seen too many consistent
traders (some of them unnaturally so) to believe the markets are
random.”86
At least to academic eyes, the responses seem to have similar
structure—and similar quality—to anecdotal evidence dismissing
climate change (“It sure was cool this summer, so global warming
can’t exist”) or evolution. To be sure, that does not mean we should
prevent people from having mistaken views any more than we
(2) to have the right to choose even if in error, and to lose money; (3) to have no right to
make a choice in error.
82. It is possible some believe they are “making money” because they are evaluating
gains and losses against the wrong frame—e.g., they may conclude they have made money
when their portfolio rises $1 on a day the market portfolio rises $2, by evaluating their per-
formance against a $0 baseline instead of the opportunity cost of not participating in the
market. Cab drivers, for example, appear to engage in daily targeting, quitting driving once
they’ve reached a certain income for the day—rather than engaging in the most “rational”
behavior of working longer hours on high-wage days (i.e., busy days) than low-wage days. See
Colin Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 407, 407 (1997).
83. Theroguetrader, Post to Random Walk Theory, TRADE2WIN FORUMS (Feb. 6, 2008, 1:38
AM), http://www.trade2win.com/boards/general-trading-chat/28912-random-walk-theory.
html.




86. Trader_Dante, Post to I Want to Believe This is Not Random, but This Argues Against Me,
TRADE2WIN FORUMS, (Oct. 6, 2009, 8:46 PM), http://www.trade2win.com/boards/general-
trading-chat/75862-i-want-believe-not-random-but-argues-against-me.html.
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should prevent people from disbelieving evolution. But it does not
mean that those acting on those views are any less mistaken (and
potentially subject to regulation if there are policy-relevant reasons)
than a teacher who teaches non-evolution based theories in their
classroom. In addition, those who worry about the day-trader’s fac-
tually errant views may also be particularly concerned that he holds
them because of third-party manipulation: fraud perpetrated by
broker-dealers, online trading platforms, or hacks hawking their in-
vestment get-rich-quick how-to guides.
Second, at least part of the enjoyment seems likely to be the thrill
of beating the market. Ask yourself if a gambler would enjoy going
to a casino where, instead of the gamblers as a whole losing system-
atically over time (with gains and losses distributed somewhat
randomly), the rule was that all gamblers lost on each bet. This
might be the “same” casino in an economic sense—i.e., provide ex-
actly the same expected rate of return—but it’s hard to imagine
sensation-seekers enjoying this casino in the same way as they enjoy
Vegas. In other words, at least part of the sensation must come from
the seeming plausibility of the (de facto) delusion that one can make
money through skill.
If we think the relevant line is taste, we would want to preserve
day trading for the sensation-seekers—they have chosen a different,
perhaps idiosyncratic end (lose money but have fun while doing
so)—while eliminating it among mis-calculators—they have simply
chosen a bad means to their end (make money). Of course, this
distinction itself could be challenged. Perhaps over-confidence is,
in some conception, an end: certainly, we can imagine that many
over-confident people value their image of themselves as an expert
and would have their overall welfare decreased by being overridden
by a requirement that they invest in index funds, even as their bank
balance grew larger. On the flip side, perhaps sensation seeking is
not much of a valuable end or, at least, not an end that policymak-
ers should respect because of other social costs.
In any given market, we may decide there is no policy-relevant
heterogeneity of tastes. Consumers who do not refinance a fixed-
rate mortgage when rates drop (net of fees to refinance) are proba-
bly not expressing a taste; more likely, they are oblivious to the
refinancing opportunities or overestimate the difficulty involved in
refinancing. Or, they may differ with respect to circumstances such
as the length of time they plan to retain the mortgage. The answer
to this is highly relevant to policymakers, who could either require
SPRING 2018] Misbehavioral Law and Economics 571
mortgages to automatically refinance87 or try to refocus the decision
on objective circumstances with respect to mortgage duration.
Other factors may complicate analysis of taste in a particular mar-
ket. For instance, taste may be endogenous to the external
environment—e.g., if taste is shaped by misleading marketing. One
brokerage firm popular among day-traders, Interactive Brokers, has
developed an ad campaign that appears to be targeted directly at
children. In the spot, a kid named Skippy is seen trading on the
platform’s fantasy trading page. He is teased by a bully, who asks
him “What’s the point if it isn’t real?” A girl steps in front and re-
bukes the bully: “With all that practice, in ten years he’ll have lots of
money. Do you want to walk me home, Skippy? You can show me
how to do that simulated trading.”88 The ad would be more amus-
ing if the evidence of financial losses caused by individual trading
was less convincing.
Likewise, tricky questions arise in deciding whether a particular
characteristic is a taste or a preference. For instance, an individual
with a retirement portfolio may not be able to meaningfully state
their own risk tolerance; they may lack the knowledge, time, and
inclination to assess it. There are ways of observing risk tolerance,
but evidence suggests that risk tolerance can be highly domain-spe-
cific and very sensitive to measurement method.89 One could also
debate whether risk more closely resembles a taste or is highly dic-
tated by circumstance (e.g., prior endowments that affect one’s
sense of security and willingness to engage in risk). Despite the
complexity of the taste-circumstance line, judging the relevant con-
stituent tastes and circumstances of consumer preferences provides
a starting point for policy analysis; the next Part shows how policy
responses could be shaped after such a distinction is made.
87. See BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT? HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO
SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 49–51 (2003). To be clear, this could cause average mort-
gage rates to rise. It is likely that in the current system, sophisticated consumers (who do
refinance) are cross-subsidized by naı¨ve consumers (who don’t); while a boon to sophisti-
cated consumers, this is not a policy-relevant separation. Indeed, it may be the opposite, as
sophisticated consumers may be systematically wealthier than naı¨ve consumers. See Campbell,
supra note 45 at 1555.
88. Interactive Brokers, Interactive Brokers—Paper Trading Account, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=U5QJatRI23o.
89. See, for example, the balloon experiments conducted by some behavioral econo-
mists. As just one example of how some economists have proposed to measure risk
preferences, consider the ‘balloon test.’ A balloon is inflated as the experiment participant is
offered increasing sums of money, but with a higher risk that the balloon will pop and elimi-
nate their accumulated rewards. See Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy & Alex Imas, Experiential
Methods: Eliciting Risk Preferences, 87 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 43, 43–44 (2013).
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II. CHOOSING A POLICY TO SATISFY PREFERENCES
This Part discusses how to align policy responses to our diagnoses
of the underlying tastes and circumstances in a particular market. I
assume that policy aims to satisfy preferences. There are reasons,
not part of this Article, that we often choose not to satisfy prefer-
ences—most notably externalities. This Part proceeds in three
sections. In Part II.A, I discuss general factors that might guide pol-
icy selection. Parts II.B and C analyze two specific strategies: proxies
(like tailored rules) that could be useful when circumstances mat-
ter, and elicitation strategies (such as ideal-type nudges) that could
be useful for distinguishing consumers based on tastes.
A. Factors Affecting the Choice of Legal Regime
The distinction between tastes and circumstances provides a cri-
terion for the choice of a distributing versus concentrating policy.
By definition, tastes are subjectively held and thus are hard for out-
siders to directly observe. By contrast, circumstances are more easily
measurable. As a result, third parties may be very good at address-
ing informational mistakes, including an individual’s own
misunderstandings about their circumstances. For instance, an in-
vestment advisor would have little claim to know a client’s taste for
riskiness more than the client herself would, but an investment ad-
visor could certainly have better knowledge of how a given
investment strategy would affect risk in an individual’s portfolio
based on more readily observable knowledge about the client’s age,
other investments, occupation, and similar characteristics. By con-
trast, to the extent individuals make mistakes because of time
inconsistency, incomplete tastes, or cognitive errors, third parties
may have little ability to address mistakes—or, if they do address
them, may not do so in a way that respects tastes.
Tastes are varied and heterogeneous, and idiosyncratic tastes
may be deeply held.90 By contrast, individuals may have inadequate
information on their own circumstances. Issuers of credit cards, for
instance, know more about how buyers use credit cards than buyers
do—and those issuers may have incentives to withhold that use-pat-
tern information.91 Put differently, tastes may more closely
resemble higher-order ends, while circumstances resemble
90. See, for example, a similar problem in the cy pres doctrine, where we attempt to
rewrite wills to match a testator’s intent when express instructions are frustrated, see MARK
Kelman, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 99–101 (1987).
91. See generally Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 24.
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means—which resembles one account of why we use fiduciaries to
choose means that match a principal’s ends.92
One effect of policy is to decide where decisions are made: to dis-
tribute decision-making out to individual consumers, or to
concentrate it in the hands of third parties. Third parties could be
regulators, fiduciaries, intermediaries, or sellers regulated such that
they do the bidding of regulators.93
In making that decision, a critical factor is the distribution of in-
formation asymmetry in a given market. In consumer finance
markets in general, information asymmetries will often run in com-
peting directions.94 For instance, consumers in the payday loan
market will have private information about their ability to repay.
Lenders in that market may have private information about the
loan terms, statistical likelihood of repayment for particular classes
of borrowers, collection practices, and so on. Clearly, we can (and
do) remedy that asymmetry partly through disclosure,95 but because
92. See Arthur Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99,
130, 103–04 (2008). Fiduciaries are common in domains where we believe the likelihood of
mistake is high and costly. The purpose of a fiduciary, in its essence, is to identify what an
agent “really wants” and choose appropriate means to that end. In theory, a fiduciary system
perfectly aligns knowledge and expertise with incentives—by giving incentives to an in-
formed principal to stand in (or near) the shoes of her clients. This, for instance, is the basis
of the commonplace idea in legal ethics that clients are in charge of selecting ends while
lawyers choose the means. Law presents a complicated environment for clients—an area
where informational costs are high, and the likelihood of cognitive error potentially high—
for which an agent (the attorney) serves as an essential guide to making normative prefer-
ence-matching choices. In turn, fiduciary law, by imposing on those entrusted with such
decisions, attempts to meaningfully constrain agency costs—the likelihood of agents to act in
their own interest rather than their principals’. Of course, fiduciary systems are expensive, in
at least two senses. For one, fiduciaries do not serve their role for free. And the higher the
constraints on agency costs—for example, the greater the likelihood of liability for violating a
fiduciary duty—the more expensive will be a fiduciary’s service. Second, no monitoring sys-
tem perfectly solves the problem of agency costs. We will always be skeptical that lawyers are
really acting in their clients’ best interest, as opposed to making problems more complicated
than they need to be, extracting excessive fees, or substituting collateral personal interests for
those of their clients.
93. Performance-based regulation is an example of a thoughtful proposal of sellers regu-
lated to do regulators’ bidding—regulators set the ends (e.g., a particular rate of literacy by
buyers) and sellers set the means. See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2015).
94. Several scholars have noted that firms sometimes collect and process information
about individual consumers that suggests they know the consumers better than the consum-
ers know themselves. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product Use Information and the
Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235 (2014); Emir Kamenica, Sendhil
Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, Helping Consumers Know Themselves, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 417
(2011).
95. At least some will also be remedied by voluntary self-disclosure, but it is debatable
how much. For the canonical works on why firms will voluntarily self-disclose, see, for exam-
ple, Sanford Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product
Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981).
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lenders are more sophisticated at processing information, even full
disclosure is unlikely to fully remedy the asymmetry running in that
direction. Although a debtor may well have better access to produc-
ing information about her ability and likelihood to repay in a
formal sense, in practice she may not be able to produce and pro-
cess that information.96
To the extent that we believe these markets may suffer more
from consumers having private information, we may leave more of
the locus of decision-making with the individual consumer. By con-
trast, to the extent we believe businesses have private information
that consumers do not process, we may move more towards dele-
gated regulations.97 This is essentially the basis of much of fiduciary
law. Lawyers, for example, exist in large part because we believe the
thicket of information required to operate effectively in the court-
room is too hard to absorb—even if it is technically available and
transparent—for the average individual.
Another key criterion is the degree of repeat choices in a market.
Repeat choices may provide for useful learning and thus may be
better retained by the consumer than delegated. This flows natu-
rally from the idea of delegation as a response to the relative
information advantages held by various parties. For instance, retire-
ment savers make portfolio allocation choices rarely (if ever), while
people make nutrition choices three or many more times per day.98
This simple fact, even more than indeterminate views about which
area involves either more complicated or more intimately personal
choices, may influence the decision to delegate versus concentrate.
Otherwise, policymakers are stuck answering difficult, subjective
questions: Is nutrition more or less complicated than finance? Are
you defined more by what you eat, or more by what you spend
money on?
96. One possible remedy is providing disclosure to the consumer based on similarly situ-
ated consumers, as advocated by Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 24.
97. One might think the latter move—towards delegation—could also be suggested by
situations in which a third party, not related to the transaction, is better at producing infor-
mation than the consumer. For instance, let’s say the government has information that would
help consumers understand their likelihood of default. However, such situations do not
clearly militate against a distributed system—with the obvious proof being the usefulness of
disclosure in at least some instances (a distributed system, albeit less distributed than a system
with no disclosure).
For example, it may be that Yelp or Zagat’s is far superior (cheaper, more thorough, etc.)
at producing information on restaurants than either a would-be diner or a prospective restau-
rant. That would not in turn suggest to any but the most indecisive among us that we should
delegate the choice of all restaurant selections to Yelp or Zagat’s.
98. Russell, supra note 26, at 72.
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B. Responding to Heterogeneous Circumstances: Tailoring Rules
If we believe payday borrowers primarily differ based on circum-
stances (as I argue in Part I.B), how would we design a regulation
that separates payday borrowers along circumstances? One possible
way would be to look at broader macroeconomic conditions in de-
ciding whether to allow payday loans. For instance, there is good
reason to believe empirical evidence that payday loans improve
community welfare following a natural disaster: after a disaster, al-
most any project invested in will have a high expected return.99 A
circumstance-tailored rule would take advantage of this finding and
allow payday loans following natural disasters, while restricting
them at other times. A second would be to look at narrower condi-
tions related to the particular borrower. What does the borrower
plan to use the money for? If there was a tractable way to draw a
consumption-investment line or an indulgence-emergency line, this
could help distinguish borrowers—but might run uncomfortably
close to paternalistic taste-tailoring.
This is just one example of a generalizable policy: tailored strate-
gies. Tailoring rules have generally not been explicitly identified as
an option by legal scholars.100 A tailored strategy is anything that is
personalized at the individual or group level. Tailoring can be ap-
plied to almost any imaginable type of policy—a nudge, disclosure,
mandate, ban, or direct regulation. Most obviously, we can try to
tailor rules around objective circumstances. Hypothetically, we can
also try to tailor rules around taste—but there are reasons to sus-
pect such systems would not truly respect tastes. Indeed, big data
theoretically could make taste-based tailoring more possible: Net-
flix, for instance, provides movie suggestions based on taste-based
inferences.
One of the few current regulations of day-trading is arguably tai-
lored around circumstances. Under FINRA regulations concerning
pattern day traders, traders must maintain at least $25,000 equity in
a margin account.101 Pattern day traders include any investor who
99. Morse, supra note 59.
100. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big
Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1418, 1421 (2014) (“No scholars have previously offered a
comprehensive theory of personalized default rules, nor has anyone explored in detail the
feasibility of such an approach.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
48–56 (2013) (“The key advantage of such [personalized] rules is that they are likely to be
more fine-grained and thus beneficial than ‘mass’ default rules.”).
101. FINRA RULE § 4210(f)(8)(B)(iv)a, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2016), https://
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p122203.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/
20180121182149/https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p122203.pdf] (margin
requirements for “Minimum Equity Requirement for Pattern Day Traders”).
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executes four or more intraday trades (buying and selling the same
security on the same trading day) in five business days. This serves
as a very weak tailored test of investors’ ability to withstand losses.102
However, the pattern day trading rules are extremely weak and
highly subject to evasion—with instructions no more than a quick
Google search away for a trader who wants to avoid them. (The rule
applies per account, not per individual.) More sophisticated means
include options trading or registering with a prop trading firm.
Circumstance-based regulation could be improved: the pattern
day trading rules could be tightened so they become harder to
evade, and/or so they require a greater level of cushioning for an
investor who is likely to lose money. Again, circumstance-based reg-
ulation may do little to improve separating along preferences: low-
wealth sensation-seekers will be left out of the market, while high-
wealth mistake-makers may be left in the market. However, circum-
stance-based regulations have the advantage of being tractable,
familiar, and less disquieting than taste-based regulations.
As suggested by the Netflix example earlier, in principle, one
could tailor around taste.103 Taste-based regulations would include
any approach that attempts to identify consumers’ taste (for sensa-
tion versus for making money) and provide different policies for
each (unrestricted trading for sensation-seekers, a ban for money-
seekers). If we wanted to tailor the regulatory regime around taste
for sensation, we would look for proxies that reveal taste. A clever
study has suggested that there is evidence that both overconfidence
and sensation-seeking exists among day-traders, by correlating day-
trading activity in Finland, where brokerage data is public, with psy-
chological measures of each: psychological tests administered to all
102. Compare this with exemptions from securities registration for private placements,
where investor wealth and income are also used as an (admittedly over- and under-inclusive)
proxy for investor sophistication. Assuming the rules are meant to test an investor’s ability to
“fend for themselves,” the private placement rule appears to be circumstance-tailoring, but
on a different basis (not protection from loss, but protection from proclivity to error).
103. Note that tailored regulation, whether tailored around circumstance or taste, does
not have to be applied on the demand side; it could also focus on the supply side as a fiduci-
ary duty (or other heightened duty) on brokers or other firms that provide services to day-
traders. Brokers could be required to monitor and justify account activity—even when fully
customer-initiated (currently they must do so for broker-initiated trading, which cannot vio-
late churning rules)—that involves a certain volume or pattern of trading activity. For
instance, the justification could include some form of evidence that a client understood that
day-traders fail to make money and chose to do so for sensation-seeking reasons. Such a rule
could have the effect of driving day-trading out of the market, because brokers might not be
willing to assume the potential liability. Alternatively, it might function as a performance-
based regulation that let the market lead in solving the problem. In order to continue captur-
ing valuable trading commissions and fees, brokers might develop innovative ways to sort
clients into sensation-seekers and mistake-makers.
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men by the Finnish Army and speeding tickets, which in Finland
are tied to income.104 A hypothetical—and perhaps fanciful, moral-
hazard-inducing—rule could allow only those with a certain num-
ber of speeding tickets to day-trade. That rule should suggest both
the plausibility of taste-tailoring as well as its limitations. As big data
improves, we can imagine that there will be increasingly sophisti-
cated proxies for sensation-seeking or other salient tastes. As
another example, day-traders involved in the activity for thrill-seek-
ing, rather than money-producing behavior, might be expected to
trade more frequently but smaller amounts.105
Those scholars who have discussed tailoring have not distin-
guished between taste and circumstance tailoring. For example,
Oren Bar-Gill has convincingly argued that a tailored disclosure for
a credit card might give customers use-pattern information, custom-
ized on a customer-by-customer basis, that helped them better
estimate their own individualized likelihood of default or of incur-
ring certain fees.106 Such disclosure would be circumstance-
tailoring and might not be able to help with an additional part of
the decision about credit cards—consumers’ understanding of
their taste for risk.
Elsewhere, Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevitz have argued that big
data can help us tailor more default rules and disclosure.107 In par-
ticular, they note that data mining can accurately predict a number
of aspects of personality type and that personalized strategies elimi-
nate many of the downsides of disclosure.108 Although they do not
draw the taste-circumstance distinction directly, Porat and
Strahilevitz’s examples generally seem more like circumstance-
based factors, despite the reference to personality type. For in-
stance, the credit-scoring agency FICO has produced data that
accurately predicts the likelihood an individual will regularly take a
prescribed medication,109 which could be used to tailor disclosures
about the risks of medical interactions. Such tailoring, by reducing
104. Grinblatt & Keloharju, supra note 76.
105. This has been suggested as a potential way of distinguishing between gamblers.
SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI, JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY
AND INFORMATION 30–31 (2d ed. 2013).
106. Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 24; see also Kamenica, Mullainathan & Thaler, supra
note 94 (another proposal to require firms to inform consumers about their usage of
products).
107. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 100.
108. Id. at 1450–53.
109. See FICO Medication Adherence Score, FICO, http://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-
medication-adherence-score [https://web.archive.org/web/20171206175255/http://www.
fico.com/en/products/fico-medication-adherence-score] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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the volume of unnecessary or irrelevant disclosures, could help im-
prove “the signal-to-noise ratio of disclosures concerning products
and services.”110 For instance, we likely have fairly homogenous
tastes for not wanting pharmaceutical contraindications that kill us,
but variable circumstances that subject us to variable risks of such
contraindications.
However, at times their proposals stray more towards taste-based
tailoring. For instance, they note that default rules about unioniza-
tion could be based on increasingly well-established data about
correspondence between personality types and union membership:
for instance, we could have unionization by default in workplaces
with high numbers of extraverted and neurotic people.111 Although
he also does not draw the circumstance-taste distinction, Sunstein
also seems to directly recognize the idea of tailoring around taste:
“The general idea is that your default rules would track what would
be best for ‘people like you.’”112
Taste-based tailoring raises troubling questions of big-data-as-
destiny: You are what the statistical average of people like you are.
This is frighteningly true in many ways (witness the accuracy of Net-
flix movie predictions) but false in others (witness its often amusing
misfires). In addition, as my choice of the word “destiny” suggests,
taste-based tailoring promotes a troubling sense that one cannot or
should not change over time.113 At the same time, taste-based tailor-
ing offers more possibility of separating, because it recognizes and
embraces the heterogeneity of preferences in a way that other ap-
proaches do not. The tradeoffs in tailoring—between improving
matching, and the democratic concerns raised by directing people
towards outcomes—raise complicated normative issues. Porat and
Strahilevitz accept that there are reasons to be cautious but note
that we already do this: “any default rule, impersonal or personal-
ized, is statistical in nature because it assigns rights and duties to
110. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 100, at 1422, 1444–47.
111. Id. at 1448–50.
112. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, supra note 100, at 55. Again, this is ambiguous depend-
ing on what “best for” means—an issue of indeterminacy in libertarian paternalism in
general, that is best addressed by Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651
(2009).
113. Strahilevetz and Porat seem surprisingly untroubled by this: “We think that most
choices about default rules are driven by personality characteristics and values, which longitu-
dinal research shows to be rather stable once people reach adulthood.” Porat & Strahilevitz,
supra note 100, at 1469. As an empirical claim for particular evaluative mechanisms over
many domains, they may well be right, although the claim may still be uncomfortable for
some. To be sure, they advocate that any such system be optional. More troubling, prefer-
ence endogeneity means that it is possible that personality characteristics would become even
stickier in a world with many such rules.
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individuals according to averaged preferences of an entire popula-
tion or a subset of people.”114 If we are doing it anyway, so the
argument goes, we might as well do it more accurately more of the
time. Of course, it should be noted that—as the framework of this
Article underscores—we do not always write societal rules around
“averaged preferences.” Indeed, policies may function in ways other
than pure majoritarian preference-satisfaction, including any pen-
alty defaults and instances where we design rules around consumers
at the tail end of a spectrum. Also, we may worry that certain types
of parties are more likely to opt out of taste-based tailoring rules.
By contrast, circumstance-based tailoring raises fewer gut con-
cerns. Many consumers would probably agree that, while their
personal tastes ought to be left to them alone, outside authorities
may have comparatively more expertise when it comes to circum-
stances. This may be particularly true for decisions that are made
infrequently and that involve complicated decision calculus. For in-
stance, a retirement planning tool can consider a variety of
circumstances that would affect rational asset allocation decisions,
such as the allocation of other assets owned by the consumer, or
actuarial data about life and career trajectory. Such a service will
have a harder time neutrally assessing a consumer’s personal taste
for risk. However, circumstance-based approaches by definition do
not account for taste and thus are limited in the amount of separa-
tion that they can provide. For instance, accredited-investor rules,
that (roughly) prevent individuals with a net worth of less than
$1,000,000 or an annual income of less than $200,000 from partici-
pating in private offerings, deter neither risk-averse wealthy
investors who misperceive risks of private offerings nor risk-seeking
poorer investors who understand and accept the risks of such
offerings.115
The contract-law doctrine of unconscionability can theoretically
serve as a circumstance-tailored approach. To be sure, successful
unconscionability cases are rare, perhaps for good reason. But in
theory, a court analyzing the procedural unconscionability prong
might attempt to tailor the outcome to the consumer’s situation.116
For instance, consumers who have an unusually high susceptibility
114. Id. at 1461–2.
115. For an argument that we should rethink these rules, see Abe Cable, Mad Money:
Rethinking Private Placements, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253, 2280–81 (2014).
116. Of course, many question whether the procedural and substantive prongs of the
unconscionability doctrine are in fact analytically different in the practice of most courts.
See, e.g., 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 18.10 (4th ed. 2010) (“The distinction between procedural and substantive abuses, how-
ever, may become quite blurred.”).
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to cognitive errors may be more likely to experience an “absence of
meaningful choice.”117 A recent (outlier) New Mexico case declared
certain high-interest signature loans procedurally and substantively
unconscionable,118 stating directly that the 1,100% and up interest
rates of these loans violated contract law, even though they did not
violate the state’s usury cap.119 The court’s reasoning—if not its out-
come—suggests that consumers who understand and genuinely
want a high interest loan might be stuck to it, while those who do
not can escape on unconscionability grounds. Indeed, the court ac-
tually cited cognitive error—and the particular susceptibility of the
low-income, low-credit plaintiffs to such error—in its reasoning.120
C. Responding to Heterogeneous Tastes: Elicitation
Elicitation attempts to get consumers to provide more informa-
tion about their tastes. Certain nudges—but not all nudges—can
serve this role. Nudging is the latest darling of the academy. Nudges
have a seductive appeal. As the term “libertarian paternalism” sug-
gests, the solution that has something for everyone; it both
regulates the market and lets the market decide. However, much of
the discontent about nudging can be explained by nudgers’ failure
to make the distinction between taste and circumstance.
Nudgers have not been clear about their purpose. Originally,
Sunstein suggested that nudges were meant to allow individual con-
sumers to dictate their ends and simply to improve the means by
which they reach those ends.121 At least two other conceptions of
nudging are possible. One, which is not relevant to this Article, is a
realpolitik conception: nudging may simply be a clever way of mar-
keting slightly progressive policy interventions in a political climate
where those interventions can otherwise not gain traction. A second
117. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
118. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 676 (N.M. 2014). Consistent
with the field of unconscionability caselaw generally, the few other courts that have discussed
unconscionability in the context of payday loans have typically done so not with respect to
interest rates, but with respect to mandatory arbitration provisions.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 667–68 & 673. Schwartz argues that in unconscionability inquiries, courts, like
regulators, should default to an assumption that consumers are acting rationality. Schwartz,
Regulating for Rationality, supra note 10, at 1410.
121. Sunstein has suggested that “[t]hough paternalists might have any number of views
about what would make people’s lives go well, recall that I am interested in defending pater-
nalists who respect choosers’ own views about their ends, and who seek to increase the
likelihood that their decisions will promote those ends.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? 75
(2014).
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conception is based on a broader view of welfarism—the poli-
cymaker as paternalist selects a nudge, on behalf of society at large,
designed to maximize overall welfare, as opposed to an individual’s
chosen view of her own welfare. Sunstein and others have been ex-
plicit that they do not mean this by “nudging,” though Russell
Korobkin has intelligently argued that a welfarist conception pro-
vides the only viable, tractable approach.122
By nudging-as-elicitation, I mean something more like the ideal-
type nudge than many of the real-world nudges that have actually
been enacted. “Ideal nudges,” as I call them, work by changing the
choice environment to force individuals to reveal more information
about their tastes. Imagine that we move the fudge to the end of the
cafeteria line, an approach which has been shown to reduce the
intake of sugary foods.123 Without restricting individuals’ ability to
consume fudge, by making it slightly more difficult to obtain the
fudge, we have asked consumers to tell us more about how badly
they want fudge: we have elicited information on the intensity of
their taste. Before implementing a nudge like hiding the fudge at
the end of the cafeteria line or installing an alarm that dings for an
unbuckled seatbelt, some portion of excessive-fudge-eaters and
seatbelt-less drivers were simply lazy or misinformed as to the rele-
vant risks, meaning that their observed signals (eating fudge and
not buckling up) were unreliable indicators of their preferences.
After the nudge, we can be more confident that the observed be-
havior corresponds to an underlying preference—innate seatbelt-
liking types are better separated in their actions from seatbelt-dislik-
ing types, who are willing to deal with the bell.
But not all nudges operate in the same way. Some nudges simply
attempt to overcome inertia: they recognize that all defaults are
“sticky”—enough consumers will not change whatever choice is
given them by default—and take advantage of this. When procrasti-
nation or other decision-avoidant behaviors are at work in a
particular domain, changing the choice architecture may be highly
effective. For instance, to the extent we think retirement savers sim-
ply do not pay attention to retirement plan related forms when they
begin employment but would in fact want to save money if con-
fronted with a choice, we can change framing to overcome inertia.
122. See Korobkin, supra note 112. That approach can also better explain some of the
nudges recently developed in the retirement savings context, which is a fundamentally pater-
nalistic system by dint of it being based on tax incentives to get individuals to save money they
otherwise would not. See Russell, supra note 26 at 43.
123. See, e.g., Paul Rozin et al., Nudge to Nobesity I: Minor Changes in Accessibility Decrease Food
Intake, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 323 (2011) http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/jour-
nal/11/11213/jdm11213.pdf.
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Indeed, strong increases in savings have been obtained by switching
from an opt-in to an opt-out regime for employees’ decisions to
contribute to their 401(k) retirement plans.124 “Active choosing” is
perhaps the purest example of an inertia-overcoming nudge: a re-
gime that forces the individual to make a choice and allows no
default option. For instance, rather than an opt-in or opt-out re-
gime an employer could require you to make an affirmative
decision—yes or no—on retirement savings on your first day of
work.125
By contrast, as I have argued elsewhere, other nudges have less of
a connection to overcoming inertia, and function more as an at-
tempt to shape substantive outcomes.126 These nudges may be
particularly subject to criticism because they are especially suscepti-
ble to counter-nudging, and bear little or no connection to the
cognitive flaws they seek to remedy. For instance, nudges that direct
those retirement dollars into target-date funds by default function
as a weak substantive mandate, rather than directly grappling with
the cognitive challenges (if any) that savers face in allocating those
funds.127
Nudges may be quite sticky—perhaps too sticky. As some have
argued, a sticky nudge at some level functions as a mandate that
destroys information about taste,128 even if in formal appearance it
maintains the right of choice. Problematically for nudgers, we often
can only evaluate the effectiveness of nudging by assuming a particu-
lar goal and measuring how many consumers get to that post-nudge
goal. (Even the term nudging refers to a spectrum. As an absurd
illustration, criminal penalties are in some sense a “nudge,” in that
124. See Russell, supra note 26, at 50–53; see, e.g., Brigitte Madrian & Dennis Shea. The
Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149
(2001) (providing a representative study). Compare Bubb & Pildes, supra note 13, 1621–23
(providing a contrary perspective by noting that effects are not evenly distributed: those who
previously saved at a percentage higher than the new default rate may actually save at a lower
rate, as a result of the stickiness of defaults) with Russell, supra note 26, at 52 (raising ques-
tions about the evidence, as well as the possibility that this may be an acceptable tradeoff
depending on the distributional requirements of policymakers).
125. Gabriel Carroll et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1639, 1639
(2009).
126. This, of course, relates to a core problem in applying behavioral economics research
to law: much of the research, and almost all of the policy analysis, depends on knowing the
“right” result. See generally Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet, supra note
13; MacCoun, supra note 13. Because of this, policymakers will often want to keep nudging
until our nudge resembles a near-mandate.
127. Russell, supra note 26, at 71–73 (arguing that many nudges substitute a weak means
of favoring a substantive preference, which creates a gap limiting the likelihood of the partic-
ular nudging venture to succeed).
128. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 670 (2006); Willis, When Nudges Fail, supra note 42, at 1157–59.
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they preserve at least some conception of choice: you can commit
the crime as long as you are willing to do the time or pay the fine.)
Sticky nudges may also endogenously reshape preferences. For in-
stance, is the large-type mileage data on new-car pricing stickers
simply aiding consumers by disclosing a data point they previously
wanted (whether because of its impact on annual fuel costs or be-
cause of personal preferences about reducing environmental
externalities) and had trouble locating, or is the disclosures’ high
salience instead functioning to convince some consumers that they
should care about mileage?
By contrast, nudges may also be too slippery.129 Most troublingly,
the failure of know-thyself interventions through slippage may be
systematically concentrated among those for whom the interven-
tions are most important. Domains with conflicts of interest may
result in counter-nudges by sellers, and those counter-nudges may
work best on the most vulnerable consumers. There is some evi-
dence that this is happening in retirement portfolios.130 Evidence
strongly suggests that such a counter-nudge effectively put the worst
debit card over-drafters—those who spent the most fees on these
high-interest loans—back into the overdraft system.131
Slippery and sticky nudges may work best on the consumer who
holds median preferences but have perverse effects on the tail-end
consumer—someone with idiosyncratic tastes. Law is often directed
towards averages for good reasons—leaving some people behind
may be inevitable. And under some criteria of efficiency, it may be
the preferable substantive outcome if treating extreme cases pro-
duces inefficiency overall. But law at other times chooses to focus
on being protective of the more vulnerable—consider the eggshell
plaintiff rule, strict products liability, or product regulation that has
a very low threshold for high-risk, low-probability events (e.g., child
toys)—even though these doctrines may sacrifice certain metrics of
efficiency.
Day-trading provides a clear example. Throughout, I take as a
given that day-trading is not a financially winning strategy132 but
129. See Willis, When Nudges Fail, supra note 42.
130. Russell, supra note 26, at 62–65.
131. Willis, When Nudges Fail, supra note 42, at 1185–1200 (describing the tools that make
policy default slippery).
132. See supra Part I.C. A different article could consider the role of uncertainty in poli-
cymaking decisions. Some advocates of nudges count this as an argument for nudging;
nudges involve a certain degree of humility by policy-makers. But all policymaking proceeds
with some degree of uncertainty. Here, the degree of certainty here seems fairly high, given
the limits of the claim (commissions and fees will swamp any plausible gains over-active trad-
ing at some level of activity) and the strength of the theoretical and empirical evidence in
support of it.
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that we still want to preserve the option for some rather than ban it
outright.133 I also assume that externalities are not a major issue in
day-trading,134 And that learning is not sufficient to help this
market.135
133. An alternative policy would simply ban day-trading by individual investors (which
would have line drawing problems). This option flies in the face of the general notion that
securities laws are based on disclosure and anti-fraud provisions, not direct investor regula-
tion. That idea has increasingly come under fire as scholars and regulators worry that those
approaches may do little for the average unsophisticated investor. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin,
Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 469–73 (2015). Moreover, day-trading presents a
particularly compelling case for more wholesale regulation because market forces provide
little protection—in fact, market forces exacerbate the problem (because of the incentives
on third parties to drive up fees). By contrast, in regular stock selection contexts, to the
extent the market is efficient, individual investors only bear non-diversification risk.
Another option in this category would be caps on commissions—lowering the fees that
are directly responsible for most of the net loss to individual investors. This might drive many
brokers out of the market of providing such a service. Alternatively, it might have negative
effects overall: it might increase the prevalence of wealth-decreasing day-trading, while per-
haps lowering the quality of trade execution, which is hard for investors to observe and may
lead to further wealth decreasing effects. Moreover, in general, price caps may be counter-
productive as consumer protection devices, because they reduce consumer incentives to
acquire information about pricing. See Armstrong, supra note 40, at 273–80.
A third option would be increasing commissions, perhaps with a tax on financial transac-
tions. Such a Tobin tax been proposed by U.S. legislators several times, most recently in 2013
and has had support from economists including Keynes, James Tobin, Joseph Stiglitz, and
Lawrence Summers. S. 410, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 880, 113th Cong. (2013); LEANARD E.
BERMAN ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR., FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(2015). The United Kingdom currently has such a tax, called the stamp tax. Stamp Duty
Reserve Tax Regulations 1986, SI 1986/1711 (Eng.).
134. On externalities, factors cut both ways. On the one hand, the day-trader is poten-
tially creating negative externalities: he is depleting the resources that are available to feed
his family, or he is putting himself at higher risk for mental health conditions or even suicide,
which imposes costs on society. But he’s also creating positive externalities: providing fools
for institutional investors to profit off of, which helps increase market efficiency by providing
rewards to those who induce efficiency. For an early exploration of the role of uninformed
traders in providing market efficiency, see Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Informa-
tion and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1976). These are all plausible
accounts, but they are so indeterminate that they cannot dictate a single avenue of poli-
cymaking. An advantage, however, is that this assessment may be more deterministic than
trying to get at people’s true preferences. See generally Korobkin, supra note 112.
135. Why would leaving the market alone, allowing day traders to learn, not be sufficient?
For one, learning may be costly. The evidence in day-trading suggests that losing traders
simply seem not to learn. Brad M. Barber et al., Do Day Traders Rationally Learn About
Their Ability? 2 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/
odean/papers/Day%20Traders/Day%20Trading%20and%20Learning%20110217.pdf (“We
document that the aggregate performance of day traders is negative, that the vast majority of
day traders are unprofitable, and many persist despite an extensive experience of losses.”).
Of course, that might be evidence for a sensation-based theory of why people trade. Or it
might suggest there is nothing to learn, and learning requires a desirable trait worth learning
about—for instance, if some people were skilled at day-trading while others were lousy at it.
However, individual day-trading is so costly, and flies so in the face of almost any reasonable
theory of financial markets, that there may be simply nothing to learn. Compare day-trading
to homeopathics: there may be nothing to learn about homeopathic quality, because the
market is simply a market for quackery to begin with.
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Is it plausible that disclosure will improve day-trading decisions?
Currently, the SEC and FINRA engage in some limited investor ed-
ucation, warning day-traders on their web site that day-trading is
“highly risky” and not appropriate for most investors. Some individ-
ual brokers provide warnings.136 For instance, the online broker
Interactive Brokers writes in its disclosures:
Day trading can be extremely risky. Day trading generally is
not appropriate for someone of limited resources and limited
investment or trading experience and low risk tolerance. You
should be prepared to lose all of the funds that you use for day
trading. In particular, you should not fund day-trading activi-
ties with retirement savings, student loans, second mortgages,
emergency funds, funds set aside for purposes such as educa-
tion or home ownership, or funds required to meet your living
expenses. Further, certain evidence indicates that an invest-
ment of less than $50,000 will significantly impair the ability of
a day trader to make a profit. Of course, an investment of
$50,000 or more will in no way guarantee success.137
If we believe that day-traders are heterogeneous with respect to
their tastes, such an intervention (1) may do very little and more
importantly, (2) may fail in a way with problematic distributional
consequences, in that the failure may be especially concentrated
among those who need regulation the most. The problems with dis-
closure as a practical strategy are widely known, as are the
responses.138 The empirical evidence on disclosure in many markets
136. Your Dollars at Risk, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 20, 2005) http://www.sec.
gov/investor/pubs/daytips.htm.
137. INTERACTIVE BROKERS, DAY TRADING RISK DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 1 (2009), https://
gdcdyn.interactivebrokers.com/Universal/servlet/Registration_v2.formSampleView?ad=day_
trading_risk_disclosure.jsp.
138. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (the definitive source on this subject); see also Wil-
kinson-Ryan, supra note 38. For responses, see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in
Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1047 (2012); Cole, supra note 37;
Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, supra note 36; Schwartz & Wilde, supra
note 37.
A thoughtful earlier account is Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 528–30 (1981) (noting the
second-order problems of how consumers and the market respond to disclosure
requirements).
Consider the “name-and-shame” disclosure requirements in securities laws, such as the
conflict minerals rule. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012). In reality, the disclosures may not
function effectively. Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129,
132 (2016).
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is not good.139 Truth-in-lending, for instance, has resulted in bal-
looning disclosures that few consumers read or understand; as one
author put it, TILA “succeeded in making consumers increasingly
aware, but it has not managed to explain to them what it is they
have been made increasingly aware of.”140 Likewise, there is little
evidence that financial literacy education helps improve consumer
decision making.141 Such education may not only be ineffective, but
also normatively undesirable because of the burdens it imposes on
individuals.142
This may be because disclosure does nothing to help individuals
with idiosyncratic tastes separate themselves from others in their
choices. For instance, if day traders suffer from systematic overcon-
fidence, as empirical evidence suggests,143 they seem unlikely to
heed warnings on the assumption that they are smarter than the
people to whom the warnings apply. But that is the group we
wanted to eliminate from day-trading, leaving only the sensation-
seekers. In addition, the Interactive Brokers warning strongly sug-
gests there is money to be made for the right people—if an
investment less than $50,000 will impair traders from making prof-
its, does that not suggest an investment more than $50,000 will lead
to profits? Indeed, the final two sentences of Interactive Brokers’
warning could, despite the disclaimer, be seen as an argument for
putting more, rather than fewer, funds at risk. In this sense, the
warnings seem to conflate risk, which carries reward, with uncer-
tainty, which does not (or, more precisely, carries the certainty of
high brokerage fees).144
Moreover, to the extent we do not substantially regulate entities
that attempt to sell day-trading services, there are strong incentives
for counter-nudges and marketing campaigns that overwhelm any
individual warnings. Brokerage firms earn lucrative commissions
139. For a comprehensive literature review of empirical evidence on disclosure, see Omri
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647,
665–79 (2011). For a useful response, arguing that we judge disclosure on the wrong basis,
see Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures and How Not to Judge Their Success or
Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333 (2013).
140. Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80
GEO. L.J. 233, 236 (1991); see also Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 139, at 666 & n.101
(citing Rubin, supra).
141. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 228 (2008).
142. See Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2011)
(describing the negative effects of financial education).
143. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odeon, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence,
and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 262–64 (2001); Grinblatt & Keloharju, supra
note 76, at 1.
144. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921) (making the preem-
inent argument for the risk/uncertainty distinction).
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from day-traders and, so long as day-traders are making the choices
themselves, are perfectly allowed to profit off such commissions
with no warnings.145 Brokers are subject to anti-churning rules to
the extent they advise clients on the use of funds in their ac-
count,146 in which case their recommendations they are held to
FINRA’s suitability standard.147 Many others make money market-
ing seminars, educational websites, and newsletters to day-traders.
Still others make money by operating prop trading floors that allow
day-traders to independently make their own trades. A simple
Google query provides a representative example of how firms try to
trick people into thinking that day-trading is a get-rich strategy; a
recent query for “daytrading” on Google produced an ad that reads
“Strategies for Beginners: +$222,244.91 in 1 Year Day Trading. Our
Students Are Profitable. Ready To Step Up The Plate?”148 More
problematically, many of these ads seem to target lower-income
consumers—i.e., not a population of retired Wall Street moguls.
CONCLUSION
Policy debates over consumer corrective legislation have become
mired in unproductive discussions of how best to promote an un-
specified, vague notion of autonomy. This Article has argued that it
is more productive to focus first on judgments about the relevant
preferences in a market and whether those preferences diverge be-
tween individuals more because of policy-relevant tastes or policy-
relevant preferences. If they are taste-based, policy should elicit
more information from consumers about their tastes. If they are
circumstance-based, policy should tailor itself around those
circumstances.
The difficulty of precisely distinguishing between the taste and
circumstance line suggests the need for further research on the
sources of preferences. It also reminds us that preference satisfac-
tion is always a problematic goal. It is not the only possible goal for
145. Despite calls for reforms, brokers remain subject to lax standards. See, e.g., Ben Ed-
wards & Christine Lazaro, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call to
Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV 47 (2014).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7(a) (2017) (defining as manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent
behavior by a broker which results in transaction that “are excessive in . . . frequency in view
of the financial resources and character of such account”).
147. The suitability standard is a lower standard than fiduciary duties, which many have
advocated changing. Edwards & Lazaro, supra note 145, at 66–67. However, it is not relevant
to self-directed day-trading.
148. “Daytrading” Search Results, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search results from
May 26, 2017) (screenshot on file with author).
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policy; policy could be primarily based on other judgments about
what is good for society. But if satisfying preferences remains our
goal, scholars cannot afford to continue dodging the ambiguities of
preferences.
